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Abstract: I’ll propose a distinction based on historical, theoretical and linguistic considerations between: (1)
two different ways of inducing a change of mind, persuading and convincing; and, (2) two different ways of
proving, rhetorical argumentation and logical-experimental demonstration. There is a tendency to keep a
distance from persuasion in favor of conviction. In everyday language, the difference between the two terms
appears clear, and it is a distinction developed theoretically by many authors from Plato and Kant to Perelman.
In particular:
1.

2.

Persuasion is centered chiefly on the speaker: it enhances one’s will and ability to modify other people’s
opinions and behavior; conviction is centered chiefly on the addressee and focuses on one’s capacity of
being convinced and of evaluating rationally. The convinced addressee is more active and enterprising
than the persuaded addressee, who remains more passive and receptive.
The act of persuading should be basically connected to the idea of a process and of belief, while the act
of convincing should be basically connected to the idea of a product and of evidence.
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1. Introduction
Logic is usually considered as being the science of the correct reasoning. Rhetoric is
commonly considered as being the art of persuading. On the mere basis of these two
definitions, logic and rhetoric appear to be opposite notions and faculties: first, because
science and art are very different practices; and second, because the notion of ‘correctness’
highly differs from the notion of ‘persuasion.’
This opposition logic/rhetoric represents a fundamental cultural antagonism, that
separates the “family” of concepts revolving around the ideas of truth, science, certainty,
reality, and demonstration (a category which can be identified with logic), from the “family”
of concepts concerning falsehood, plausibility, appearance, opinion, argumentation (a
category which can be associated with rhetoric).
Logical demonstration and rhetorical argumentation have two features in common: the
same (inferential) nature and the same function (the purpose of proving). But they also bear
important differences: they have different subject matters, different addressees, different
guiding principles, different languages, different contexts of use and different evaluation
standards.
2. Logic and rhetoric

According to these premises, logic and rhetoric can interact with one another on the
basis of four different categories: exclusion, complementarity, partial overlap, and inclusion.
The first case, that one of exclusion, does not allow you to use rhetorical argumentation in
logic or in science, because it has a negative function. In the second hypothetical situation,
that of complementarity, argumentation is possible in logic and science, but its function
remains marginal and occasional, that is not relevant. As for the third case, that of partial
overlap, argumentation is useful, relevant, and holds a heuristic function. In the fourth and
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last case, that one of inclusion, argumentation is essential and plays a crucial role also in
logical and experimental evidence (cfr. Cattani, pp. 184-85).
Negative and positive characteristics of the art of rhetoric can be schematically
displayed in the tables below:
Table 1
Negative and positive traits of rhetoric
RHETORIC
NEGATIVE TRAITS

POSITIVE TRAITS

«Empty rhetoric, vacuous speech»
Stylistic art
Elocutio
Practice of persuasion
Manipulation, suasion
Discursive technique
Natural talent, un-teachable ability

«Vir bonus dicendi peritus»
Argumentative art
Elocutio + Inventio, Dispositio
Theory of persuasion
Persuasion by argumentation
Global strategic behaviour
Teachable ability

Table 2
Fault and value of rhetoric
RHETORIC
FAULT

VALUE

COGNITIVE

Vicious reasoning because
groundless or based on arational/irrational elements.
Empty verbalism.
Figures of speech.

Argumentative schemes heuristically
valid and apt to grasp the manifold
aspects of reality.
Educational value.
Reasoning.

METHODOLOGICAL

Fallacious method, based on
superficial, enthymematic and
aphoristic formulations.

Critical open-mindedness.

ETHICAL

Rhetoric is blameworthy for
being deceitful and responsible
for simulating pseudo-truths.

Rhetoric is associated to prudence,
anti-authoritarianism, and challenge.

SOCIAL

Rhetoric is dangerous because of
its partiality, demagogy, and
seductive tendency.

Rhetoric represents and promotes
broad-mindedness, anti-dogmatism,
and democracy, tolerance.

From a theoretical point of view, logic appears to be the most powerful resource; but
from a pragmatic point of view it is not so, because even logic is not exempt from insidious
fallacies. In debate, the problem does not concern the use of rhetorical moves (which seems
to be unavoidable), but the fact that people attending the debate can possibly risk not
detecting and counterbalancing intentional and/or unintentional fallacies, mistakes and tricks:
if, using logical and rhetorical tools, we succeed in counteracting and neutralising them from
a purely theoretical point of view (that is, in terms of purely intellectual categorization of
strategies and techniques), we would greatly improve dialogue analysis and practice.
Using the words of Snider & Schnurer (p. 43):
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Debaters become inoculated against the use of persuasive techniques in exchange for
good arguments because they are aware of the tactics that persuader use to win the mind
of their audiences. More important…along with these skills emerge defences against
being persuaded and an ethical understanding of the possible negative elements of
persuasion. These methods can have negative effects and thus the debaters may gain a
realization that “cheap” avenues of persuasion should be avoided.
Provisionally and questionably, I would suggest that we should use two categories, i.e., 1) “to
convince” and 2) “to persuade” to differentiate two different kinds of effectiveness. The
persuasion dialogue, the “dialogue in order to persuade”, aims at modifying people’s
opinions and behaviours while the “dialogue in order to convince” aims at gaining the
intellectual approval of the interlocutor(s).
3. Persuasion and conviction
We tend to keep distance from rhetoric, especially from rhetorical moves in favour of logical
rules. In logical terms, we prefer to speak of “rules”, while in rhetorical terms we prefer to
speak of “moves”. Logical rules are clear and universally approved, while rhetorical moves
are questionable and debatable.
We tend to keep distance from persuasion, in favour of conviction. Conviction and
persuasion appear different; Plato, Kant, and Perelman agree on this. Let me quote a passage
from Jean-Jacques Rousseau in which he focuses on this substantial difference:
Il est aisé de convaincre un enfant que ce qu’on lui veut enseigner est utile: mais
ce n’est rien de le convaincre, si l’on ne sait le persuader. En vain la tranquille
raison nous fait approuver ou blâmer; il n’y a que la passion qui nous fasse agir.
(Rousseau, livre III, pp. 237-38).
It is easy to convince a child that what you want to teach him is useful: but it is
useless
to convince him if you cannot persuade him. In vain the quiet reason
makes us approve or blame; it is only passion that makes us act.
Simply considering the two English terms “to convince” and “to persuade”, we easily
realize they are not synonymous. As a matter of fact, we can say: “It is difficult to convince
someone that my statement is true,” or “It is almost impossible to convince a prejudiced
person that her/his opinions do not tally with the facts,”1 even though there is no linguistic
structure sounding like: convincing someone to do something. However, it is possible to
persuade someone to do something. The verb “to convince” is used only in the sense of
convincing someone of a fact, or to state “that a fact is what it is.” If you aim to induce
somebody to do something, you will better use the verb “to persuade.” The verb “to
convince” seems referring to the realm of thinking, not that of doing; it does not serve to
induce somebody to act but to gain intellectual agreement and assent.
Also in Italian we find lexical evidence for a difference between the two verbs. For
example, the expression “logica della persuasione” (“logic of persuasion”) is admitted, while
the expression “retorica della convinzione” (“rhetoric of conviction”) is very unconventional.
Terms like “rational,” “reasoned,” and “logical” are hardly ever associated with “persuasion,”
while terms like “emotional,” “passionate,” and “rhetorical” do not fit to “conviction.”
We tend too to keep distance from polemic in favour of dialogue. In terms of
discursive exchange, dialogue and polemic bear some mutual similarities, but from a social
and ethical point of view they appear to be exact contraries.
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Nevertheless, in a dialogic exchange, if the interlocutors are firmly convinced of their
own opinions, they easily use rhetorical, persuasive and polemical tools. The study and the
practice of debate – meant primarily as public debate –, has to deal with certain opposite,
essential conditions: co-operation and conflict, plain dialogue and crude polemic, friendly
conversation and quarrel. Is a good discussion compatible with polemic, persuasion and
rhetoric, or not? In other words: is it compatible with the desire to win, or not?
Since “good” means basically ‘honest’ and ‘logic,’ we should determine if ethic and
logic on one hand and rhetoric on the other hand are in conflict; if conviction and persuasion
are really such different things; if the apology of dialogue (which seems to get along with
logic) and the apology of polemic (which seems to get along with rhetoric) may coexist.
I would try to answer these questions starting from another question, concerning
persuasion and conviction. The question is: why does the term dis-suasion exist while there is
no entry for *dis-conviction? We can persuade or convince somebody of something. On the
contrary, even though we can dis-suade somebody, we cannot *dis-convince him/her. Why
do we lack of a lexicographic entry indicating the antonym of the act of “convincing”? This
anomaly tells us a lot, and it is equally noteworthy that it does not exist the antonym of the
verb “to dedicate,” which should hypothetically sound like *to dis-dedicate.
Let’s say that rhetoric is the art of persuasion; we could not say that it is the art of
conviction. Persuasion and conviction are not interchangeable words/concepts. And the
reason why they are not interchangeable can be explained stressing an odd and interesting
lexical phenomenon: the antonym of the verb “to persuade” is “to dissuade”. So, what is the
antonym of “to convince,” a verb which is often used (improperly), as synonym for “to
persuade”?
Checking the synonym and antonym finder, we can see that the antonym of “an act
aiming at convincing or persuading someone” is explained through a word/verb which bears
the idea of “diverting,” “urging,” “exhorting someone against (someone else),” or
“persuading not to do something.” But the antonym of the verb “to persuade” is the verb “to
dissuade,” while looking for the antonym of “to convince” we do not have a symmetrical
correspondence.
Consequently, admitting the significance of the common language, we end up
wondering why does the word “dis-suasion” exist, while we do not have any entry for “*disconviction,” that is the equivalent antonym of the semantic family including “to convince”
and “conviction.” The situation can be represented as follows:
to persuade / to dissuade
to convince / to *dis-convince
In everyday language, the difference between the two terms appears clear, and – as we
have already explained – it is a distinction developed theoretically by many authors. It can be
summarized as follows:
1. Persuasion refers primarily to the realm of actions; conviction refers primarily to the
realm of thoughts.
2. Persuasion concerns mainly manipulation, it has to do with the idea of “mastering”
which seems absent in conviction.
3. Persuasion is an act, which makes use of emotions, while conviction does not
involve any pathos.
4. Conviction appears to be stronger and more powerful than persuasion.
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5. Unlike “to persuade,” the verb “to convince” is synonym for “to demonstrate,” “to
prove,” “to verify,” and “to induce someone to do/think something by means of
verification.”
6. Unlike conviction, persuasion has sophistical nature.
7. Persuasion is centred chiefly on the speaker, it enhances his/her will and ability to
modify other people’s opinions and behaviour; conviction is centred chiefly on the
addressee, focuses on his/her capacity of being
convinced
and
evaluating
rationally. The “convinced” addressee is more active and enterprising than the
“persuaded” addressee, who remains more passive and receptive.
In short: conviction is a more crystalline, more rationally supported and more firmly
guaranteed notion. The standard exemplification of the persuasion/conviction dynamics,
according to the way they are used in English and Italian2, is clarified in the following table:
Table 3
Persuasion/conviction dynamics as used in English and Italian
PERSUASION

CONVICTION

Action
Manipulation
Pathos, ethos
Weakness
Uses any means
Sophistry
More speaker’s action / less
addressee’s involvement

Thought
No manipulation
Logos
Strength
Relies on proof and evidence
No sophistry
More addressee’s action / less
speaker’s involvement

This elementary linguistic test and this rough comparison suggest that the verb “to
persuade” should be basically connected to the idea of a process, while the verb “to
convince” should be basically connected to the idea of a product. A process is adaptable (like
any work in progress), while a product is a result, a halt (like any acquired or vested right).
Even democracy falls into the category of the “processes”; it is not a “static condition,”
because it is to be acquired rather than simply transferred or exported.
However, this opposition between “conviction” and “persuasion” has to be seen as the
normal juxtaposition between demonstration and argumentation: we usually employ
argumentation, relegating demonstration to very few and specific cases. Consequently, our
persuasion can become conviction only within a narrow range of specific situations: for
example, when the subject matter or the method is appropriate, i.e., when we can apply the
principle of non contradiction.
Let us consider the following example: a judge said that mafia is not going to be
defeated through the simple appeal to morality; it is mandatory to make people understand
that this “rebellion” to the mafia-culture can be useful and profitable, that legality would
bring profit, combining logic with interests, rationality with benefits. Blaise Pascal said
something similar about the idea of “necessity” to demonstrate, first, that religion is a good
thing, and then that religion is true.
In a letter to Ferruccio Rossi Landi (January 20, 1960), Norberto Bobbio writes: “An
order is an order even if it is not obeyed; an advise is an advise even if it is not taken; a
medical instruction is a medical instruction even if it is not followed” (cfr. Quaranta: pp. 9495). A convincing speech is considered so even if the addressee is not convinced. This is one
reason why there cannot be, in my opinion, an act called: *dis-conviction.
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4. Aristotle’s and Lausberg’s persuasion
Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric is “dúnamis perì ékaston toû theorêsai tò endekómenon
pithanón” namely “the faculty of discovering any available mean of persuasion for/in every
situation” (Aristotle, 1355 b 25-26). Heinrich Lausberg’s definition of rhetoric is “the system
of rules that assures the success of persuasion” (Lausberg, § 92).
Aristotle defines rhetoric as “dúnamis”, that is a faculty or a “theoretical” activity
aiming at digging up all the available means of persuasion: “the task of rhetoric is not to
persuade but to identify what is apt to persuade in every field” (Aristotle, 1355 b 11).
Heinrich Lausberg (confirming the ordinary sense of the common idea/concept of
rhetoric) includes the idea of success among the goals of the art of rhetoric, in the same way
as you would include the recovery of a patient among the goals of medical sciences.
These two definitions seem similar; indeed, they are extremely different. Aristotle’s
definition deals with the concept of value, while Lausberg’s deals with the concept of danger
(the dangerous potential of rhetoric).
This danger occurs normally when someone is firmly convinced of something and
firmly believes in something. Conviction is a primary power. Conviction is a product. The
non-irrelevant way to gain conviction (i.e., to get this “product”) is a process that involves
and combines logical and rhetorical moves.
5. Conclusion
We can persuade somebody to believe or to act. However, even if we can dis-suade, we
cannot *dis-convince him or her. It is, practically and theoretically, noteworthy that there is no
a thesaurus entry indicating the antonym of the act of convincing, that seems related more to a
logical-experimental evidence and is centred more on the addressee, while persuading refers
more to a rhetorical argumentation and is centered chiefly on the speaker.
The vir bonus dicendi peritus, the honest man able to speak, neither restricts herself to
theory, indicating values, declaring principles and asserting ideals, nor confines
himself/herself to pure action, managing reality unaware of principles, values and ideals.
Similarly, the good “discussant” neither uses merely logical tools, nor uses merely rhetorical
moves.
Persuasion is a key element in debate process that ultimately is persuasive in nature,
because its goal is to persuade the audience or the judge to vote for your argument or
proposal. Certainly, the tone of voice can be persuasive. Appeals to emotional responses,
emphasis, stressing key phrases, words can be persuasive. Saying the words correctly, saying
the words clearly, emphasizing the right words can have a persuasive impact. Persuasive
speech may include rhetorical structures (repetition examples, paradox…) and irony/humor.
Confidence and calmness are positively persuasive techniques.
But the central part of any debate are good arguments, that appeal to intellectual means
and responses: the sound reasoning, the evidence, the examples are convincing.
Briefly, the training in argumentation and debate can be a good defence against
persuasion and ethical issues of persuasion. The “duties” (i.e., the duty to respect logical
rules) and “rights” (i.e., the right to use rhetorical moves) are not necessarily in conflict. The
good arguer knows and employs both logical tools and rhetorical moves: he is both
convincing and persuading.
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1

I have found this warning in the dictionary edited by Virginia Browne, Odd pairs and false friends
(1987).
2
The distinction between two kinds of beliefs is also in Kant’s vocabulary: Überzeugung (more
objective) and Überredung (more subjective), whose translation by Giorgio Colli and others
corresponds respectively to “convinzione” and “persuasione” (see: Critica della ragion pura. Milano:
Adelphi, 1976, pp. 797-798). Cf. Kritik der reinen Fernunft (17872. Part II, Chapt. II, Sect. III.) Cf.
also Kritik der Urteilkraft, 17993, § 53, where Überredung is connected with Überlistung.

7

